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First-Order Modal Logic:
Frame Definability and Lindstro¨m Theorems
R. Zoghifard∗
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Abstract
This paper involves generalizing the Goldblatt-Thomason and the Lindstro¨m
characterization theorems to first-order modal logic.
Keywords: First-order modal logic, Kripke semantics, Bisimulation, Goldblatt-
Thomason theorem, Lindstro¨m theorem.
1 Introduction and Preliminaries
The purpose of this study is to extend two well-known theorems of propositional modal
logic, namely the Goldblatt-Thomason and the Lindstro¨m characterization theorems,
to first-order modal logic. First-order modal logic (FML) provides a framework for
incorporating both propositional modal and classical first-order logics (FOL). This,
from a model theoretic point of view, means that a Kripke frame can be expanded by
a non-empty set as a domain over which the quantified variables range. In particular,
first-order Kripke models subsume both propositional Kripke models and classical first-
order structures.
The celebrated Goldblatt-Thomason theorem provides a model theoretic character-
ization of elementary classes of frames which are definable by a set of propositional
modal sentences. This theorem states that an elementary class of Kripke frames is
definable by a set of propositional modal formulas if and only if it is closed under
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bounded morphic images, generated subframes and disjoint unions and reflects ultra-
filter extensions. Our first objective here is to provide a formulation of this theorem in
FML.
The second aim of this paper is to study Lindstro¨m type theorems for first-order
modal logic. These theorems determine the maximal expressive power of logics in
terms of model theoretic concepts. In a seminal paper [15], Lindstro¨m proved that any
abstract logic extending first-order logic with compactness and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem
property is not more expressive than the first-order logic.
To formulate our problems in technical terms, it is worth it to have a quick overview
of basic notions of FML. Suppose τ is a language consisting of countable numbers of
countably many constant and relational symbols. The usual syntactical conventions of
first-order logic are assumed here. In particular, the notions of τ -terms and τ -atomic
formulas are defined in the usual way. Furthermore, first-order modal τ -formulas are
defined inductively in the usual pattern as follows:
φ ∶= P (t1, . . . , tn) ∣ t1 = t2 ∣ ¬φ ∣ φ ∧ φ ∣ ∃xφ(x) ∣ ◊φ,
where P is an n-ary predicate and t1, . . . , tn are τ -terms. Bound and free variables in a
formula are defined as in first-order logic. A τ -sentence is a formula without any free
variable. The other logical connectives (∨, →, ↔, ∀), and the modal operator ◻ have
their standard definitions.
A constant domain Kripke model is a quadruple M = (W,R,D, I), where W ≠ ∅ is
a set of possible worlds, R ⊆W ×W is an accessibility relation, and D ≠ ∅ is a domain.
Moreover,
i. for each w ∈W and any n-ary predicate symbol P , I(w,P ) ⊆ Dn,
ii. for any w,w′ ∈W and each constant c, I(w, c) = I(w′, c) ∈ D.
More generally, a varying domain Kripke model is a tupleM = (W,R,D, I,{D(w)}w∈W ),
where (W,R,D, I) is a constant domain model and for each w ∈W , D(w) ≠ ∅ is a do-
main of w such that D = ⋃w∈W D(w). The pair F = (W,R) and the triple S = (W,R,D)
are respectively called frame and skeleton. A Kripke model M = (W,R,D, I) is said to
be based on the frame F = (W,R) or skeleton S = (W,R,D). For a given first-order
Kripke model M and any w ∈W , the pair (M,w) is called a pointed model.
An assignment is a function σ, which assigns to each variable v an element σ(v)
inside D. Two assignments σ and σ′ are x-variant if σ(y) = σ′(y) for all variables
y ≠ x. We denote this by σ ∼x σ′.
The notation tM,σ is used for the interpretation of t in M under assignment σ.
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Let w be an arbitrary world of a varying domain modelM and σ be any assignment.
For a τ -formula φ(x¯), The notion of “φ(x¯) is satisfied at w with respect to σ” is defined
inductively as follows.
• M,w ⊧σ t1 = t2 if and only if t
M,σ
1
= tM,σ
2
.
• M,w ⊧σ P (t1, . . . , tn) if and only if (t
M,σ
1
, . . . , t
M,σ
n ) ∈ I(w,P ), P is an n-ary
predicate.
• M,w ⊧σ ¬φ if and only if M,w /⊧σ φ.
• M,w ⊧σ φ ∧ ψ if and only if M,w ⊧σ φ and M,w ⊧σ ψ.
• M,w ⊧σ ∃xφ(x) if and only if there is an x-variant σ′ of σ with σ′(x) ∈ D(w)
and M,w ⊧σ′ φ(x).
• M,w ⊧σ ◊φ if and only if for some w′ ∈W with wRw′, M,w′ ⊧σ φ.
Note that while I(w,P ) is not assumed to be a subset of D(w), the existential
formulas are satisfied in world w exactly when a witness can be found within D(w).1
Let M and N be two first-order Kripke models. We call M a submodel of N
whenever
i. FM is a subframe of FN, that is WM ⊆WN and RM = RN ↾WM.
ii. For any w ∈WM, DM(w) ⊆DN(w).
iii. For any w ∈ WM and any n-ary predicate P , IM(w,P ) = IN(w,P ) ∩ DnM. Also,
IM(c) = IN(c) for all constant symbols c.
In this situation we use the notation M ⊆N.
The model M is an elementary submodel ofN, denoted byM ⪯N, whenever M ⊆N
and for any w ∈WM, a1, . . . , an ∈DM and any formula φ(x1, . . . , xn),
M,w ⊧ φ(a1, . . . , an) if and only if N,w ⊧ φ(a1, . . . , an).
Now the first part of this paper is devoted to considering the question of which
elementary classes of frames are definable by a set of first-order modal sentences. This
is a natural generalization of the Goldblatt-Thomason theorem which was also studied
1In some literature, e.g [21] and [10], the satisfaction of predicates in any world is related to its
domain that is P (a1, . . . , an) is true in w if and only if ai ∈ D(w) and (a1, . . . , an) ∈ I(w,P ). But we
accept the notion which is used in many other references like [8] and [2].
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by many authors for various extensions of propositional modal logic. (For example [18]
for hybrid logic, [17] for graded modal logic, and for some other extensions [14].)
Here we answer this question fully by the following theorem (Theorem 2.16).
Theorem. Let K be an elementary class of frames. Then K is definable by a set
of first-order modal sentences if and only if it is closed under bounded morphic images,
generated subframes, and disjoint unions.
As we have mentioned the second target of our research is to maintain some versions
of Lindstro¨m theorem for first-order modal logic. The original theorem of Lindstro¨m
has been also extended to propositional modal logic. De Rijke in [4, 5] showed that
any abstract logic extending modal logic with the finite depth property is equivalent to
modal logic. Van Benthem in [19] showed that the finite depth property is captured by
compactness, relativization and bisimulation invariance, improving de Rijke’s result.
This result shows that the propositional modal logic is the strongest logic satisfying
compactness and the relativization property and is invariant under bisimulation. Later,
van Benthem, ten Cate and Va¨a¨na¨nen in [20] proved a Lindstro¨m theorem for some
fragments of first-order logic. Since the finite depth property fails for modal logic
with global modality and guarded fragment of first-order logic, Otto and Piro in [16]
proved the Lindstro¨m theorem for these logics by using compactness, corresponding
bisimulation invariance and the Tarski union property. By generalizing this method,
Enqvist in [6] proved a version of Lindstro¨m’s theorem for any normal modal logic
corresponding to a class of Kripke frames definable by a set of strict universal Horn
formulas. Also Venema and Kurz in [13] used coalgebraic methods for proving a version
of Lindstro¨m’s theorem. Enqvist in [7] proved a coalgebraic Lindstro¨m theorem that
generalizes the van Benthem’s result.
Here we show that first-order modal logic with respect to constant domain Kripke
models is a logic which has the maximal expressive power among the logics satisfying
the compactness property and is invariant under bisimulation.
Furthermore, using a different method, based on Tarski union property, we give a
Lindstro¨m theorem with respect to class of varying domain Kripke models.
It is worth mentioning that the key point in proving both results here is to view
first-order Kripke models as first-order structures in a suitable language in which the
basic properties of these structures can be expressed. Of course the expressive power of
FML comparing to propositional modal logic is the key advantage which allows us to
prove both the Goldblatt-Thomason and the Lindstro¨m Theorems. We must indicate
that this well-known method is specified as modal correspondence theory.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 2 some basic model theoretic
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results for FML are proved. Also, the notion of saturated models is reviewed and a
version of the Hennessy-Milner theorem for FML is established. These developments
yield us some versions of the Goldblatt-Thomason theorem for FML.
In section 3, at first the notion of abstract logic is reviewed. In subsection 3.2,
by considering only constant domain Kripke models we adapt the original proof of
Lindstro¨m’s theorem for first-order logic in an elaborate way to prove the corresponding
Lindstro¨m theorem for first-order modal logic. In subsection 3.3 a version of Lindstro¨m
theorem is given with respect to varying domain Kripke models based on the Tarski
union property method.
We will assume that the reader is familiar with the basic notions of propositional
modal logic. Also, for further reading on first-order modal logic we refer to [11, 8, 2].
2 Model Theory of First-Order Modal Logic
In this section some model theoretic notions for FML are introduced. These methods,
in particular allow us to extend a version of the Goldblatt-Thomason theorem to first-
order modal logic.
2.1 Bisimulation and Invariance Theorems
In this subsection the key notions of bisimulation and saturation are discussed for first-
order Kripke models and some of their model theoretic properties are explored. These
central concepts play an important role in proving the Lindstro¨m theorem for FML.
The bisimulation notion is obtained by combining the usual definition of bisim-
ulation for the propositional modal logic with the corresponding notion of potential
isomorphism from first-order logic. See Chapter 11 of [22], in which a similar no-
tion of world-object bisimulation for certain varying domain models, called cumulation
domain, is given.
Let D⋆ be the set of all finite sequences over D. For w ∈ W and a1 . . . an ∈ D⋆ we
use the abbreviation wa¯ instead of (w,a1 . . . an).
All Kripke models in this subsection are assumed to be varying domain.
Definition 2.1. Let M and N be two Kripke models. The relation Z ⊆ (WM ×D⋆M) ×
(WN × D⋆N) is called a bisimulation if for any ((w, a¯), (v, b¯)) ∈ Z with ∣a¯∣ = ∣¯b∣ the
following three conditions hold:
1. for any atomic formula φ(x¯), we have M,w ⊧ φ(a¯) if and only if N, v ⊧ φ(b¯).
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2. (◊-forth) For all w′ ∈ WM with wRMw′ there is v′ ∈ WN such that vRNv′ and
(w′, a¯)Z(v′, b¯).
(◊-back) For all v′ ∈ WN with vRNv′ there is w′ ∈ WM such that wRMw′ and
(w′, a¯)Z(v′, b¯).
3. (∃-forth) For any c ∈ DM(w) there is d ∈ DN(v) with (w, a¯c)Z(v, b¯d).
(∃-back) For any d ∈DN(v) there is c ∈DM(w) with (w, a¯c)Z(v, b¯d).
Also call wa¯ and vb¯ bisimilar if there is a bisimulation Z between M andN such that
(w, a¯)Z(v, b¯). In this situation we use the notation (M,wa¯) ⇄ (N, vb¯). By (w,v) ∈ Z
we mean that (wλ, vλ) ∈ Z where λ is the empty sequence in D⋆.
Note that the notion of bisimulation generalizes both the notion of bisimulation for
propositional modal logic and potential isomorphism for first-order logic. The following
proposition can then be proved by induction on the complexity of formulas.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose (M,wa¯) ⇄ (N, vb¯). Then for any formula φ(x¯) with ∣x¯∣ =
∣a¯∣ = ∣¯b∣,
M,w ⊧ φ(a¯) if and only if N, v ⊧ φ(b¯).
One of the key properties in first-order logic is that for a given finite language τ ,
two first-order τ -structures M and N are elementary equivalent if and only if they are
k-partially isomorphic for all k ∈ N. One of the advantages of the above definition
of bisimilarity is that it helps generalizing this property of first-order logic to the
present context. To this end, for every pair of natural numbers l, r the concept of
(l, r)-bisimilarity is defined.
Let ≤ be a componentwise order on N×N; that is, (l, r) ≤ (l′, r′) if and only if l ≤ l′
and r ≤ r′.
Definition 2.3 ((l, r)-Bisimulation). Let (M,w) and (N, v) be two pointed Kripke
models and a¯ ∈ D⋆M and b¯ ∈ D
⋆
N be sequences of the same length. We say that wa¯ and
vb¯ with ∣a¯∣ = ∣¯b∣ are (l, r)-bisimilar, and denote it by (M,wa¯) ⇄(l,r) (N, vb¯), if there
exists a sequence of relations ⟨Z(i,j) ∶ 0 ≤ i ≤ l,0 ≤ j ≤ r⟩ such that:
(i) wa¯Z(l,r)vb¯.
(ii) If w′c¯Z(0,0)v′d¯ then ∣c¯∣ = ∣d¯∣ and M,w′ ⊧ φ(c¯) if and only if N, v′ ⊧ φ(d¯), for any
atomic formula φ(x¯).
(iii) ◊-forth and ◊-back: if w′c¯Z(i+1,j)v′d¯ and w′RMw′′, then there is v′′ ∈ WN with
v′RNv′′ such that w′′c¯Z(i,j)v′′d¯ and vice versa.
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(iv) ∃-forth and ∃-back: if w′c¯Z(i,j+1)v′d¯ and c′ ∈ DM(w′), then there is d′ ∈ DN(v′)
with w′c¯c′Z(i,j)v′d¯d′ and vice versa.
Regarding the definition above, in the following we define degree and a function
that assigns to each formula a pair of natural numbers.
Definition 2.4. For the first-order modal formula φ(x¯) the degree of φ is inductively
defined as follows.
• δ(φ(x¯)) = (0,0), for every atomic formula φ.
• δ(¬φ) = δ(φ).
• If δ(φ) = (l, r) and δ(ψ) = (l′, r′), then δ(φ ∧ ψ) = (Max(l, l′),Max(r, r′)).
• If δ(φ) = (l, r), then δ(◊φ) = (l + 1, r).
• If δ(φ) = (l, r), then δ(∃xφ(x)) = (l, r + 1).
Assume that Γ is any set of first-order modal formulas with at most n free variables
among x¯ = x1, . . . , xn. Let (M,w) and (N, v) be two pointed Kripke models with w ∈
WM, a¯ ∈ DM, v ∈ WN and b¯ ∈ DN where ∣a¯∣ = ∣¯b∣ = n. The notation (M,wa¯) ≡Γ (N, vb¯)
means that for any φ(x¯) ∈ Γ, M,w ⊧ φ(a¯) if and only if N, v ⊧ φ(b¯). If Γ is a set
of first-order modal formulas all with at most n free variables among x¯, we omit the
subscript Γ and write (M,wa¯) ≡ (N, vb¯). For Γ = {φ(x¯) ∣δ(φ) ≤ (l, r)} the notation
above is (M,wa¯) ≡(l,r) (N, vb¯). Finally, two pointed Kripke models (M,w) and (N, v)
are elementary equivalent, (M,w) ≡ (N, v), if for any sentence φ, we have M,w ⊧ φ if
and only if N, v ⊧ φ.
Proposition 2.5. Let (M,w) and (N, v) be two pointed Kripke models. If (M,wa¯)⇄(l,r)
(N, vb¯), then (M,wa¯) ≡(l,r) (N, vb¯).
Proof. By induction on (l, r).
Proposition 2.6. Suppose τ is finite. Then (M,wa¯) ⇄(l,r) (N, vb¯) if and only if
(M,wa¯) ≡(l,r) (N, vb¯).
Proof. The left to right direction follows from Proposition 2.5.
To show the other direction, note that since the language τ is finite, by induction
on (l, r), up to logical equivalence, there is a finite set of formulas with degree at most
(l, r).
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So, it suffices to prove that the sequence ⟨Z(i,j) ∶ 1 ≤ i ≤ l,1 ≤ j ≤ r⟩, where
Z(i,j) = {(wa¯c1 . . . cr−j, vb¯d1 . . . dr−j) ∣ wa¯c1 . . . cr−j ≡(i,j) vb¯d1 . . . dr−j}
is a (l, r) bisimulation. But this can be proved in a similar way as in Proposition 2.31
in [1].
Fixing a bijective coding function ⟨, ⟩ ∶ N×N→ N we say that (M,w) and (N, v) are
k-bisimilar provided that if ⟨l, r⟩ = k. Since the coding function ⟨, ⟩ is bijective, there
are unique functions left and right from N to N such that left(k) = l and right(k) = r
if and only if k = ⟨l, r⟩. Using this coding function we may adapt Definition 2.4 to say
that two models are k-bisimilar for k ∈ N .
First-order modal logic can be viewed as a fragment of two-sorted first-order logic.
This is beneficial especially in proving number of properties for this logic, for example
compactness and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property. To this end, for a given first-order
modal language τ one can consider a two-sorted language τ cor whose sorts are denoted
by sW and sO. The first sort sW corresponds to the set of possible worlds and the
second sort sO distinguishes the set of objects. So τ cor has two binary predicates
R(u,u′) and E(u,x) where u,u′ ∈ sW and x ∈ sO. The intuitive meaning of R(u,u′) is
that u is related to u′ via the accessibility relation R and E(u,x) is interpreted as the
object x being in the domain D(u). The language τ cor includes all constant symbols of
τ and for a given n-ary predicate p(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ τ , τ cor includes (n + 1)-ary predicate
P (u,x1, . . . , xn).
So, any first-order modal τ -formula can be inductively translated to a τ cor-formula
as follows:
• STu(t1 = t2) = t1 = t2,
• STu(P (x1, . . . , xn)) = P (u,x1, . . . , xn),
• STu(¬φ) = ¬STu(φ),
• STu(φ ∧ ψ) = STu(φ) ∧ STu(ψ),
• STu(◊φ) = ∃u′(R(u,u′) ∧ STu′(φ)),
• STu(∃xφ(x)) = ∃x(E(u,x) ∧ STu(φ)).
Furthermore, any first-order Kripke model M can be viewed as a τ cor-structure M∗
in the natural way.
The following proposition is obtained by induction on the complexity of first-order
modal formulas.
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Proposition 2.7. Let φ(x1, . . . , xn) be any first-order modal formula. Then for any
Kripke model M with w ∈W and a1, . . . an ∈D
M,w ⊧ φ(a1, . . . , an) if and only if M∗ ⊧ STu(φ)(w,a1, . . . , an).
Similar to propositional modal logic the van Benthem invariance theorem also holds
for FML.
Theorem 2.8 (Invariance Theorem [22]). Let α be a first-order τ cor-formula. Then α is
a translation of some modal τ -formula if and only if it is invariant under bisimulations.
The notion of a modally-saturated model, introduced below, is a modification of ω-
saturation in first-order model theory. To this end, we first need to define the notion of
a type over a Kripke model. For a given varying domain Kripke modelM = (W,R,D, I)
and a finite subset A ⊆ D, the language τA is an expansion of τ by adding some new
constant symbols ca for all a ∈ A. The τA-Kripke model MA expands M naturally by
interpreting any constant symbol ca by a itself.
Definition 2.9. Let Γ(x¯) be a set of τA-formulas whose free variables are among x¯. A
set of formulas Γ(x¯) is an ∃-type of (MA,w) if for all finite subsets Γ0(x¯) of Γ(x¯), we
have MA,w ⊧ ∃x¯⋀Γ0(x¯). Similarly, Γ(x¯) is a ◊-type of (MA,w) with respect to some
a¯ ∈ D, if MA,w ⊧ ◊⋀Γ0(a¯) for all finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ.
A type of (M,w) is either a ◊-type or an ∃-type of (MA,w) for some finite subset
A ⊆ D.
Definition 2.10. An ∃-type Γ(x¯) is realized in (M,w) if there are a¯ ∈D(w) such that
M,w ⊧ Γ(a¯). Likewise, a ◊-type Γ(x¯) is realized in (M,w) with respect to a¯, if there
is an element w′ ∈W such that wRw′ and M,w′ ⊧ Γ(a¯).
A model M is modally-saturated (or m-saturated for short) if for every w ∈W and
each finite subset A of D, every type of (M,w) is realized in (M,w).
Next we present the first-order version of the Hennessy-Milner theorem.
Theorem 2.11 (Hennessy-Milner Theorem). Let M and N be two modally-saturated
Kripke models. Then (M,w0a¯0) ≡ (N, v0b¯0) if and only if (M,w0a¯0)⇄ (N, v0b¯0).
Proof. The right to left direction is derived from Proposition 2.2. For the other direc-
tion, one can show that the set
Z = {(wa¯, vb¯) ∣ (M,wa¯) ≡ (N, vb¯)}
is a bisimulation between M and N with w0a¯0Zv0b¯0.
Let M be a Kripke model. We call M an ω-saturated model if M∗ is ω-saturated
as a first-order τ cor-structure. Obviously any ω-saturated model is also m-saturated.
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2.2 Frame Definability
Our objective in this section is to prove some form of the Goldblatt-Thomason theorem
for first-order modal logic. The Goldblatt-Thomason theorem states that an elementary
class of frames is definable by a set of propositional modal formulas if and only if it is
closed under bounded morphic images, generated subframes and disjoint unions, and
reflects ultrafilter extensions [1]. Here, we consider the question of which elementary
classes of frames are definable by a set of first-order modal sentences. To motivate this
question we first give Example 2.13 which shows that there exist a class of Kripke frames
which is not definable by a set of propositional modal formulas but is definable by a
set of first-order modal sentences. While the validity of first-order modal formulas are
preserved under bounded morphic images, generated subframes, and disjoint unions,
we see that the validity of first-order modal formulas in frames is no longer reflected by
ultrafilter extensions. Furthermore, our main result (Theorem 2.16) shows that if the
class of Kripke frames is closed under these three operations, then it can be defined by
a set of first-order modal sentences.
Throughout this subsection we focus on constant domain Kripke models. Hence-
forth, we suppose τ is a first-order modal language and F is a frame. We say that a
τ -formula φ(x1, . . . , xn) is valid at a world w of the frame F if for any constant domain
τ -model M based on F, we have M,w ⊧ ∀x1 . . .∀xnφ(x1, . . . , xn). In this case we write
F,w ⊧ φ(x1, . . . , xn). We also say φ(x1, . . . , xn) is valid on the frame F, denoted by
F ⊧ φ(x1, . . . , xn), whenever it is valid in any world w ∈W .
A class of Kripke frames K is FML-definable if for some language τ there exists
a set of first-order modal τ -sentences Λ such that for any frame F, we have F ∈ K if
and only if all sentences of Λ are valid on F. More generally, a set of first-order modal
formulas Λ defines K if, for any Kripke frame F we have F ∈K if and only if F ⊧ ∀x¯φ(x¯)
for any formula φ(x¯) ∈ Λ.
By the substitution property one can see that if a class of frames K is definable
by a set of propositional modal formulas (PML-definable for short) then it is also
FML-definable.
Suppose θ(p1, . . . , pn) is a propositional modal formula and P1(x), . . . , Pn(x) are
atomic formulas where Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is a unary predicate and x is a single variable. The
substitution of θ(p1, . . . , pn) is a first-order modal formula θ(P1(x), . . . , Pn(x)) which
is obtained by uniformly replacing each proposition pi by an atomic formula Pi(x) for
some variable x.
Proposition 2.12. Let K be any class of frames. If K is PML-definable then it is
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also FML-definable.
Proof. Suppose K is definable by a set of propositional modal formulas ΛP . Let τ =
{P1, P2, . . . , Pn, . . . } consist of countably many unary predicates and put ΛFO to be a
set of all formulas of ∀x θ(P1(x), . . . , Pn(x)) for θ ∈ ΛP . Then one can easily see that
ΛFO defines K.
The converse of the above proposition is not true in general. This means that
there are some classes of frames which are first-order modally definable but not PML-
definable.
Example 2.13. Consider the class of frames which satisfy the condition that every
world has a reflexive accessible world (i.e. ∀x∃y(Rxy ∧Ryy)). As is mentioned in [1]
page 142, this class is not definable by any set of propositional modal formulas, since it
does not reflect the ultrafilter extension. However this class is definable by the formula
◊∀x(◻P (x) → P (x)).
Clearly, ◊∀x(◻P (x) → P (x)) is valid on any such frame. For the converse suppose
that F is a frame with some world w0 that does not have any reflexive successor. Let
M = (F,D, I) be a constant domain model based on F such that ∣D∣ ≥ ∣{w′ ∣ wRw′}∣.
Moreover, for each w′, accessible by w0 there exists a distinct element dw′ ∈ D such
that P (dw′) is false in w′ but it is true in all successors of w′. Then for any w′ with
w0Rw′, we have M,w′ /⊧ ∀x(◻P (x) → P (x)). So M,w0 /⊧ ◊∀x(◻P (x) → P (x)).
The above example shows in particular that the validity of first-order modal sen-
tences is not reflected by ultrafilter extension. So by this example it is natural to ask
if any version of the Goldblatt-Thomason theorem holds for FML.
Next we prove that the validity of first-order modal formulas is preserved under
bounded morphic images, generated subframes and disjoint unions. Let us begin by a
quick review of the corresponding concepts.
Let F and G be two Kripke frames. A function f ∶WF →WG is a bounded morphism
from F to G if
• wRFw′ implies f(w)RGf(w′), and
• if f(w)RGv, then there exists w′ ∈WF such that f(w′) = v and wRFw′.
If, in addition, f is surjective, then G is called a bounded morphic image of F and is
denoted by F↠ G.
A frame F is a generated subframe of G, F↣G, if WF ⊆WG and RF = RG ↾WF and
in addition, for any w ∈WF if wRGw′ then w′ ∈WF.
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Suppose ⟨Fi ∶ i ∈ I⟩ is a family of disjoint Kripke frames. The disjoint union of Fis
is a frame F in which W = ⊎i∈IWi, R = ⊎i∈I Ri. In this case we write F = ⊎i∈I Fi.
For a Kripke frame F = (W,R) let Uf(W ) be the set of all ultrafilters over W .
Define the binary relation Rue on Uf(W ) as follows. For any u,u′ ∈ Uf(W ), uRueu′
if and only if m◊(X) = {w ∣ ∃w′ ∈W s.t wRw′} ∈ u for any X ∈ u′. The Kripke frame
ue(F) = (Uf(W ),Rue) is called an ultrafilter extension of F. Finally, for any w ∈ W
set wˆ as the principal ultrafilter generated by w.
Proposition 2.14. The validity of first-order modal sentences are preserved under
bounded morphic images, generated subframes, and disjoint unions.
Proof. The proof is a simple generalization of the proof of Theorem 3.14 in [1] for
propositional version.
Similar to propositional case one may prove that any frame is a bounded morphic
image of the disjoint union of its point-generated subframes.
A first-order modal formula φ(x1, . . . , xn) is called universal if it is in the form
∀y1, . . . ,∀ymψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym) where ψ is a quantifier-free formula.
Proposition 2.15. Let K be a class of frames definable by a set of universal modal
sentences in some language τ . Then K is definable by a set of propositional modal
formulas.
Proof. Suppose that the class K is defined by a set of universal modal formulas Λ.
By Proposition 2.14 K is closed under bounded morphic images, generated subframes,
and disjoint unions. We show that K reflects ultrafilter extensions, and hence by the
Goldblatt-Thomason theorem it is definable by a set of propositional modal formulas.
Assume that ue(F) ∈ K for some frame F. It is enough to show that F ⊧ Λ.
Otherwise for some universal sentence φ = ∀x¯ψ(x¯) ∈ Λ there is a model M based
on F and world w ∈ WF where M,w /⊧ φ. Let ue(M) be a model based on ue(F)
with the set DM as domain. Also for any u ∈ Uf(W ) and any n-ary predicate P ,
(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Iue(u,P ) if and only if {w ∈ WF ∣ (a1, . . . , an) ∈ IM(w,P )} ∈ u. Then
by induction on the complexity of formulas one may show that for any quantifier-free
formula ψ, we have M,w ⊧ ψ(a1, . . . , an) if and only if ueM, wˆ ⊧ ψ(a1, . . . , an). Hence
ue(M), wˆ /⊧ φ, a contradiction.
The following theorem is a version of the Goldblatt-Thomason theorem for first-
order modal logic. From now on, we assume that τ is a language containing for each
n ∈ N a countable set of n-ary predicate and a countable set of constant symbols.
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Theorem 2.16. Let K be an elementary class of frames. Then K is definable by a
set of first-order modal τ -sentences if and only if it is closed under bounded morphic
images, generated subframes, and disjoint unions.
Proof. If K is definable by a set of first-order modal sentences then by Proposition
2.14 it is closed under the three operations as required by the theorem.
For the other direction, suppose K is closed under bounded morphic images, gen-
erated subframes, and disjoint unions. Let ΛK be the set of all first-order modal
τ -sentences valid on any frame G ∈ K. We show that ΛK defines K. Clearly, ΛK is
valid on any frame of K. Conversely, assume F ⊧ ΛK . Since K is closed under bounded
morphic images, generated subframes, and disjoint unions, without loss of generality
we assume that F is point-generated by w0.
Let τ ′ = {R,P} ∪ {cw ∣w ∈ W} be a language consisting of a unary predicate P ,
a binary predicate R, and new constants cw for any w ∈ W . Let M = (F,D, I) be a
model based on F such that D =W . In each world w, put I(w,P ) = {w}. In all worlds,
R(w,w′) holds if and only if (w,w′) ∈ RF. Finally interpret each constant cw as w.
Take ∆ as the set of all τ -sentences true in (M,w). Since F is point-generated by
w0, for each w ∈ W there is a finite number nw which is the length of the shortest
path from w0 to w. So for each w,w′ ∈ W and for all n ∈ N, ∆ contains the following
sentences.
1. ◊nwP (cw).
2. ◻ncw ≠ cw′ , if w ≠ w′.
3. ◻n∃x(P (x) ∧ ∀y(P (y)→ x = y)).
4. ◻nR(cw, cw′), if (w,w′) ∈ R.
5. ◻n¬R(cw, cw′), if (w,w′) /∈ R.
6. ◻n∀x∀y(P (x) ∧ ◊P (y)→ R(x, y)).
7. ◻n∀x∀y(P (x) ∧R(x, y)→ ◊P (y)).
8. ◻n(∃x(P (x) ∧ φ(x, c1, . . . , cn)) → φ(cφ, c1, . . . , cn)), for any φ as a {R}-formula
and for some cφ.
9. ∀x1, . . . , xk(φ(x1, . . . , xk)→ ◻nφ(x1, . . . , xk)), for any {R}-formula φ .
10. ∀x1, . . . , xk(◊nφ(x1, . . . , xk)→ φ(x1, . . . , xk)), for any {R}-formula φ .
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Claim1. ∆ is finitely satisfiable in K.
Otherwise there is δ ∈ ∆ which is not true in any constant domain model based
on the frames of K. So ¬δ ∈ ΛK . But this contradicts with the fact that F ⊧ ΛK .
Hence there is a frame G ∈K and a constant domain model (N, v0) based on G such
that N, v0 ⊧ ∆. Once again without loss of generality we assume that G is generated
by v0.
Now let G′ = (W ′,R′) where W ′ = {a ∈ DN ∣ N, v ⊧ P (a), for some v ∈ G}, and
(a, b) ∈ R′ if and only if N ⊧ R(a, b).
Claim 2. F is isomorphic to a first-order elementary submodel of G′ as a model in the
language {R}.
Define the map f ∶W →W ′ sending any w to (cw)N, the interpretation of constant
cw in N. By conditions 1 and 2 f is an injective function. Furthermore, f is an
elementary embedding, since conditions 4, 8, and 10 hold.
Claim 3. G↠G′.
Let h ∶G→ G′ be a function such that h(v) = av where av is the unique element of
DN such that P (av) is true in v. Since G is generated by v0 and (N, v0) satisfies
condition 3 from ∆, h is a function and is by definition surjective. The forth
property is obtained by conditions 6 and 10, and the condition 7 implies the back
property. So G′ is a bounded morphic image of G.
By closure of K under bounded morphic images we have G′ ∈ K. Now since K is
elementary, Claim 2 implies that F ∈K.
3 Lindstro¨m Theorem for First-Order Modal Logic
In this section we present various versions of Lindstro¨m’s theorem for first-order modal
logic. These theorems can be seen as some model theoretic characterizations of this
logic. First the notion of an abstract logic is reviewed.
3.1 Abstract Logic
Throughout this section all the languages are assumed to be relational. So any language
σ = P ∪ C is assumed to be a relational language, where P and C are a set of predicate
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and constant symbols, respectively. In some cases we use the notation (P,n) to indicate
that P is an n-ary predicate.
For a relational language σ, by a σ-structure (or σ-model) we mean a pointed
varying domain Kripke σ-model. Let Str[σ] be the class of all σ-structures.
For given M ∈ Str[σ] and σ′ an expansion of σ, one may expand M by interpreting
any new symbols of σ′ Ó σ inside M and form a σ′-structure M′. In this situation, M
is called the reduct of M′ to the language σ; this is denoted by M =M′ ↾ σ.
Definition 3.1. An abstract logic is a pair (L,⊧L), where
1. L is a map that assigns to each language σ a class L[σ]; whose members are
called (abstract) σ-sentences. Likewise an L[σ]-theory is a set of L[σ]-sentences,
2. ⊧L is a satisfaction relation, that is a binary relation between σ-structures and
σ-sentences,
which satisfies the following properties:
• if σ ⊆ σ′, then L[σ] ⊆ L[σ′].
• (Occurrence) For each φ ∈ L there is a finite language σφ, such that for any
σ-structure (M,w), M,w ⊧L φ is defined if and only if σφ ⊆ σ.
• (Expansion) For σ ⊆ σ′, if σ′-structure (M′,w) is an expansion of σ-structure
(M,w), then for any φ with σφ ⊆ σ, M,w ⊧L φ implies M′,w ⊧L φ.
An abstract logic L′ extends L, and denoted by L ⊆ L′, if for any σ and any sentence
φ ∈ L[σ], one can find a sentence ψ ∈ L′[σ] such that for a give σ-model (M,w),
M,w ⊧L φ if and only if M,w ⊧L′ ψ.
Two abstract logic L and L′ are equivalent, L ≡ L′, if L ⊆ L′ and L′ ⊆ L.
The following definitions single out some conditions which can be satisfied by some
abstract logic, in particular by FML.
Definition 3.2. • (Closure under boolean and modal connectives) For any lan-
guage σ, L contains all atomic sentences of σ and is closed under boolean con-
nectives ¬, ∨ and ∧ and modal operators ◻ and ◊. Furthermore, the satisfaction
of atomic sentences as well as boolean connectives and modal operator have the
same satisfaction relation in ⊧L as in FML.
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• (Closure under quantifiers) For any φ ∈ L[σ] and each constant c ∈ σ there are
sentences ∃xcφ(xc) and ∀xcφ(xc) in L[τ Ó {c}] such that for any σ Ó {c}-
structure (M,w),
– M,w ⊧L ∃xcφ(xc) if and only if Md,w ⊧ φ, for some d ∈D(w).
– M,w ⊧L ∀xcφ(xc) if and only if Md,w ⊧ φ, for all d ∈D(w), .
(The model Md is an expansion of M to a σ-structure which assigns d as an
interpretation of c).
Any bijective map ρ ∶ σ → σ′ is a renaming if it maps any relation symbol to a
relation symbol with the same arity and any constant symbol to a constant symbol.
For any σ-structure M and any renaming ρ ∶ σ → σ′, we can define a corresponding
structure ρ[M] ∈ Str[σ′] which is defined using ρ in the obvious way, as a counterpart
to M. The interpretation of an element Q ∈ σ′ is the interpretation of ρ−1(Q).
Definition 3.3. (Renaming) An abstract logic L has the renaming property if for any
renaming ρ of language σ and for any L[σ]-sentence φ there is an L[ρ(σ)]-sentence
ρ(φ) such that for every σ-structure (M,w),
M,w ⊧L φ if and only if ρ(M),w ⊧L ρ(φ).
We say that a constant domain modelM is closed under the predicate P (x, c1 . . . , cn)
if for any w and w′ in W if M,w ⊧ ∃xP (x, c1, . . . , cn) and M,w′ ⊧ ∃xP (x, c1, . . . , cn),
then for any d ∈D we haveM,w ⊧ P (d, c1, . . . , cn) if and only ifM,w′ ⊧ P (d, c1, . . . , cn).
Next we want to define the notion of relativization property for an abstract logic.
This property is only defined for constant domain Kripke models, since relativization
is used in Theorem 3.7 which is only valid for constant domain models.
Definition 3.4. (Relativization) For any L[σ]-sentence φ and any predicate P (x, c1, . . . , cn)
where P and c1, . . . , cn are not in σ, there exists a sentence φP in L[σ ∪{P, c1, . . . , cn}],
such that for any constant domain σ ∪ {P, c1, . . . , cn}-structure (M,w) closed under
P (x, c1, . . . , cn),
M,w ⊧L φ
P if and only if MP ,w ⊧L φ,
where MP is a σ model satisfies,
• W P = {w′ ∈W ∣ M,w′ ⊧ ∃xP (x, c¯)}.
• DP = {a ∈D ∣ M,w ⊧ P (a, c¯), for any w ∈W P}.
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• RP = R ↾W P .
• For any w′ ∈W P , IP (w′,−) = I(w′,−) ↾DP .
Remark 3.5. First-order modal logic has the relativization property. To see this, for a
given first order modal σ-sentence φ and atomic formula P (x, c¯) we let the relativization
of φ to P (x, c¯) be the sentence φP ∶= ψP ∧∃xP (x, c¯) where ψP is defined inductively as
follows:
• If φ is an atomic sentence, then ψP = φ.
• If φ = ∃xθ(x), then ψP = ∃x(P (x, c¯) ∧ θP (x)).
• If φ = ◊θ, then ψP = ◊(∃xP (x, c¯) ∧ θP ).
The following properties highlight some of model theoretic features which are true
in FML and can be used for its characterization.
Definition 3.6. Let (L,⊧L) be an abstract logic.
• L has the (countable) compactness property if for every (countable) set T of L[σ]-
sentences, T has a model provided that every finite subset of T has a model.
• L is invariant under bisimulations, if for every two σ-structures (M,w) and
(N, v), such that (M,w) ⇄ (N, v) the two structures satisfy the same set of
L-sentences, that is M,w ⊧L φ if and only if N, v ⊧L φ, for any φ ∈ L[σ].
• L has the Tarski union property (TUP) if for any elementary chain of σ-structures
⟨Mi ∶ i ∈ N⟩, the union ⋃i∈NMi is an elementary extension of each Mi.
From now on, since there is no danger of ambiguity, for brevity we omit the subscript
L from ⊧L.
3.2 Lindstro¨m Theorem
In this subsection, we provide a version of Lindstro¨m’s theorem for FML. Here it will
be shown that FML with respect to constant domain Kripke models, is a maximal logic
which satisfies compactness and bisimulation invariance properties. The proof naturally
mimics in a more elaborate way the existing proof for first-order logic. The main proof
strategy behind the classical Lindstro¨m theorem is to encode partial isomorphisms
between two models in an expanded language. More precisely, by way of contradiction,
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if a given σ-sentence φ in an abstract logic L does not have a first-order equivalent
σ-sentence, then one could obtain two sequence of first-order structures ⟨Mi ∶ i ∈ N⟩
and ⟨Ni ∶ i ∈ N⟩ such that Mk and Nk are k-partial isomorphic but do not agree on
φ. Now one can suitably expand the language σ to σ′ in which the notion of k-partial
isomorphism for σ-structures as well as basic properties of the structure (N,≤) can
be formalized. So after providing such suitable expansion σ′ using compactness and
the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property one could obtain two countable σ-structures MH and
NH indexed by a non-standard number H in an elementary expansion of the structure
(N,≤) which are H-partial isomorphic. On the other hand, since H is a non-standard
element, it follows that MH and NH are partially isomorphic and therefore isomorphic
by countability ofMH andNH but do not agree on φ. This contradicts the Isomorphism
property of abstract logic L.
Now there is a subtlety for extending this proof to FML. This is due to the fact that
in the case of first-order modal logic, the logic cannot quantify over possible worlds
in the same way as elements of the domain. To overcome to this difficulty we expand
the language with some new predicates for “worlds” and “accessibility relation”. The
expanded language provides some new predicates for possible worlds and accessibility
relation in addition to components which are provided in the original proof. So this
expansion enables us to encode a bisimulation of two models and prove the following
theorem.
Note that in the following theorem we restrict ourselves to constant domain Kripke
models and furthermore assume that an abstract logic has the closure properties of
Definition 3.2 and the renaming and the relativization properties in the Definition 3.3
and 3.4, respectively.
Theorem 3.7. Any abstract logic L containing first-order modal logic is equivalent to
FML if and only if it is countably compact and invariant under bisimulations.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that there is a sentence φ ∈ L which is not equivalent
to any formula of FML. By the Expansion and Occurrence properties, we can assume
that σ = σφ and therefore σ is finite. So by Proposition 2.6, for each (l, r) ∈ N × N,
there are two models (M,w) and (N, v) which are ⟨l, r⟩-bisimilar but do not agree on
φ. By bisimulation invariance property we can assume that (M,w) and (N, v) are
point-generated models.
So for each k ∈ N, take (Mk,wk) and (Nk, vk) to be two pointed k-bisimilar models
such that Mk,wk ⊧L φ but Nk, vk ⊧L ¬φ.
Like the proof of Lindstro¨m’s theorem for first-order logic (see Theorem 2.5.4 in
[3]), we want to construct a new model (C, c0) which has M and N as a submodel
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and we would like to be able to say that for each k ∈ N, a model C has two k-bisimilar
submodels which disagree on φ. To this end, we introduce a suitable expanded language
σLind = σskeleton ∪ σbisim which is introduced to prove the desired properties. By the
Isomorphism property, we may further suppose that all the constants of σ have the
same interpretation in all the Mk. Moreover, their domains Dk, are disjoint from N.
Now let M be the union ofMks which has each Mk as a submodel. Respectively, N can
be constructed in a similar way by the additional assumption that the interpretation
of each constant of σ is equal to the interpretation of it in M.
First step, defining σskeleton: A σskeleton carries out the task of extracting the
frame structure of a σ-model and encoding it as a part of a domain of a σskeleton-model.
Hence we need to add the set of worlds and the set of natural number to the domain.
Furthermore, we want to be able to distinguish between the elements of each of these
sets, so one may add three new different predicates to the language for each of the sets,
domain, worlds, and index. To avoid further complications, and make our sentences
simpler, we present a language σLind as a many-sorted language instead of using three
above predicates.
A σskeleton has three sorts “world”, “object” and “index”. We use the letters
w,v,w′, v′ for variables of the world sort, x, y, x′, y′ for variables of the object sort
and letters k, l, n, r, s for variables of the index sort.
Let σM be the language consisting of five new predicates, (worldM,2), (rootM,2),
(domM,2) and (relM,3) and (modM,2).
Expand the model M = (WM,RM,DM, IM) to the model M′ = (WM,RM,D′M, I
′
M)
in σ ∪ σM as follows. Put D′M = DM ∪WM ∪N. (Note that WM = ⋃n∈NWMn.) While
DM is the interpretation of object sorts, WM is for world sorts and N is for index
sorts. An element w of WM in D′M is denoted by w. To describe I
′
M we need to give
interpretations to new predicates.
• worldM(w,m) is true in w if and only if w ∈ WMm that is I
′
M(w,worldM) =
{(w,m)}.
• rootM(w,m) holds exactly in w when w is the root of Mm.
• In any w ∈WMm, domM(a,m) is true in w if a ∈DMm.
• relM(w,w′,m) is true in w if and only if wRMmw
′.
• I ′M(w,modM) = {(a,m) ∣ a ∈DMm(w)} for all w ∈WMm.
In a similar way the language σN and subsequently N′ can be constructed.
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Let σskeleton be the language which adds to σ ∪σM ∪σN one constant symbol λ and
three new binary predicates dom⋆M and dom
⋆
N and ≤ together with a new (n + 1)-ary
predicate symbol P ⋆ for each n-ary predicate symbol P in σ.
Now construct a new pointed Kripke σskeleton-model (C, c0) = (WC,RC,DC, IC, c0) as
follows:
WC ∶=WM ⊎WN ⊎ {c0},
DC ∶=D′M ∪D
′
N ∪ ⋃
n∈N
D⋆Mn ∪ ⋃
n∈N
D⋆Nn ,
2
and
RC ∶= RM ⊎RN ⊎ {(c0,w) ∣ w ∈WM ⊎WN}.
For any w ∈ WM (resp. w ∈ WN), all the symbols of σ ∪ σM (resp. σ ∪ σN) have
the same interpretation as in M′ (resp. N′). Also for any n-ary predicate P in σ
and w ∈WM, I(w,P ⋆) = {(w, a1, . . . , an) ∣ (a1, . . . , an) ∈ IM(P,w)}. Similarly interpret
any P ⋆ in any w ∈ WN . The rest of symbols are interpreted by empty set, whenever
w ∈WM ⊎WN .
Now we aim that the interpretation of symbols σM∪σN except the predicates modM
and modN in c0 reflects the structure M ⊎N. So for instance we define
• (w,m) ∈ IC(c0,worldM) if and only if w ∈WMm,
• and relM(w,w′,m) is true in c0 if and only if wRMmw
′.
The other symbols can be interpreted similarly.
Put IC(c0, P ⋆) = {(w, a1, . . . , an) ∣ (a1, . . . , an) ∈ IC(w,P )}, I(c0,≤) = {(m,m′) ∣ m ≤
m′}, and IC(c0, dom⋆M) = {(a¯,m) ∣ a¯ ∈ D
⋆
Mm
}. Similar interpretation is used for the
predicate dom⋆N in c0.
Finally, let the interpretation of constant λ be the empty sequence inD⋆ = ⋃n∈ND⋆Mn∪
⋃n∈ND⋆Nn .
Second step, defining σbisim: σbisim converts the notion of k-bisimilarity of two
σ-models into some first-order σbisim-statements.
Let σbisim = {=, (Z,6), (⌢,3), (⟨, ⟩,3), (left,2), (right,2)}. Except for =,Z the
other relation symbols are intended to be interpreted as graphs of functions which are
needed to encode the notion of bisimilarity. The relation ⌢ is reserved for concatenation
function on D⋆Mn and D
⋆
Nn
for all n ∈ N which is interpreted as
⌢(a¯, b¯, c¯) if and only if a¯, b¯, c¯ ∈ D⋆Mn and c¯ = a¯b¯.
2Recall that D⋆ is the set of all finite subset of a set D
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The other relations are implemented for the coding function. To ease the notations we
interpret them as function symbols.
Let σLind = σskeleton ∪ σbisim. Now we expand the σskeleton-model C to σLind-model
C′ = (WC,RC,DC, IC′ , c0) by interpreting the corresponding relations.
The interpretation of IC′(Z, c0) is the set of all 6-tuples (w, a¯,v, b¯, l, k), where w ∈
WMl, a¯ ∈ D
⋆
Ml
and v ∈WNl , b¯ ∈ D
⋆
Nl
and there exit a1, . . . , an ∈ DMl and b1, . . . , bn ∈ DNl
such that a⌢
1
. . .⌢ an = a¯, b⌢1 . . .
⌢ bn = b¯, and wa1 . . . an ⇄k vb1 . . . bn.
The other symbols can be interpreted naturally in c0 as defined in the preceding
section (see section 2.1).
For the rest of possible worlds w ∈WC′ interpret elements of σbisim as empty set.
Third step, introducing L[σLind]-theory TLind: In this step we are going to
introduce an L[σLind]-theory to formalize the notion of bisimilarity. To proceed with
this idea we introduce a sequence of L[σLind]-sentences. Let f,g ∈ {M,N} and f ≠ g.
1. The following sentences state that for any world from WM and WN in the frame
there is a unique element from world sort that satisfies either worldM or worldN
for some n respectively, and for each element of world sort there is a corresponding
world in the frame.
(a) ∀w∀n ( (worldM(w,n)↔ ◊worldM(w,n)) ∧
(worldN(w,n)↔ ◊worldN(w,n)) ).
(b) ∀w∀n ¬(worldM(w,n) ∧worldN(w,n)).
(c) ◻ ( ∃w∃n ((worldM(w,n)∨worldN(w,n))∧¬(worldM(w,n)∧worldN(w,n))
∧ ∀w′∀n′((w ≠ w′ ∨ n ≠ n′)→ (¬worldM(w′, n′) ∧ ¬worldN(w′, n′)))).
2. Any accessible world w′ from w ∈ Wfn satisfies worldf(w′, n) and is accessible
from c0.
(a) ∀w∀n ◻ (worldf(w,n)→ ◻∃w′worldf(w′, n)).
(b) ∀w∀n∀w′(◊(worldf(w,n) ∧ ◊worldf(w′, n)) → ◊worldf(w′, n)).
3. There is a one-to-one corresponding between the domain of Dfn and the elements
from domain sort which satisfy domf(−, n). Moreover (C′, c0) is closed under
domf(−, n).
(a) ∀n∀x (domf(x,n) → ◻ (∃w worldf(w,n)→ domf(x,n))).
(b) ∀w∀n∀x (◊(worldf(w,n) ∧ domf(x,n)) → domf(x,n)).
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(c) ∀w∀w′∀n∀x ( ◻ (worldf(w,n) → domf(x,n))↔
◻ (worldf(w′, n)→ domf(x,n))).
(d) ∀w∀n ◻(worldf(w,n)→ ∀n′(¬∃x domg(x,n′)∧(n ≠ n′ → ¬∃x domf(x,n′))).
(e) The domain of models Mn and Nn, for any n ∈ N, is non-empty,
∀n (∃x domM(x,n) ∧ ∃x domN(x,n)).
(f) The interpretation of any constant c ∈ σ is in the domain of all Mn and Nn,
for all n.
∀x (x = c→ ∀n(domM(x,n) ∧ domN(x,n))).
4. For any n ∈ N the predicate modf(−, n) specifies model fn.
∀n ◻ (∃w worldf(w,n) → ∀x(domf(x,n)↔modf(x,n)) ∧
∀n′(¬ ∃x modg(x,n′)∧(n ≠ n′ → ¬∃x modf(x,n′)))).
5. The atomic formula P (a1, . . . , an) is true in the world w if and only if P ⋆(w, a1, . . . , an)
is true in both c0 and w.
(a) ∀w∀n∀x1 . . .∀xn ◻ (worldf(w,n)→ (P (x1, . . . , xn)↔ P ⋆(w,x1, . . . , xn))).
(b) ∀w∀x1 . . .∀xn (P ⋆(w,x1, . . . , xn)→ ◻(∃n worldf(w,n)→ P (x1, . . . , xn)).
(c) ∀w∀n∀x1 . . .∀xn (◊(worldf(w,n) ∧ P (x1, . . . , xn))→ P ⋆(w,x1, . . . , xn)).
6. There is a back and forth property between the relation Rfn and the predicate
relf(−,−, n).
(a) ∀w∀n ◻ (worldf(w,n)→ ∀w′(relf(w,w′, n)↔ ◊worldf(w′, n))).
(b) ∀w∀w′∀n (relf(w,w′, n)→ ◻(worldf(w,n)→ relf(w,w′, n))).
(c) ∀w∀w′∀n (◊(worldf(w,n) ∧ relf(w,w′, n)) → relf(w,w′, n)).
7. The predicate dom⋆f (−, n) indicates the elements of D
⋆
fn
and λ is a constant which
is interpreted as the empty sequence in D⋆.
• ∀n∀x1, . . . ,∀xk (⋀1≤i≤k domf(xi, n)↔ dom⋆f (x
⌢
1
. . .⌢ xk, n)).
• ∀x∀y(x⌢y = λ→ x = λ ∧ y = λ).
8. For any n ∈ N, each of fn has a root.
(a) ∀n∃w (◊rootf(w,n) ∧ ∀w′(w ≠ w′ → ¬◊rootf(w′, n))).
(b) ∀n∀w ◻ (rootf(w,n) → worldf(w,n)).
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9. For each n ∈ N, while the Mn’s root satisfies φ, the Nn’s root refutes φ.
∀n ∀w (◻(rootM(w,n)→ φmodM(x,n)) ∧ ◻(rootN(w,n)→ ¬φmodN(x,n))).3
10. The following σLind-sentences state the basic properties of bisimilarity in the
language σLind and all of them are true in (C′, c0).
(a) ∀w,v,∀x1, . . . , xn, y1 . . . , yn,∀l, k ( Z(w,x⌢1 . . .
⌢ xn, v, y
⌢
1
. . .⌢ yn, l, k) →
(left(k) ≤ left(l) ∧
right(k) ≤ right(l) ∧
worldM(w, l) ∧worldN(v, l) ∧
⋀1≤i≤n domM(xi, l) ∧⋀1≤i≤n domN(yi, l)).
(b) Two bisimilar worlds w and v satisfy the same atomic formulas.
∀w,v,∀x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn,∀k, l ( Z(w,x⌢1 . . .
⌢ xn, v, y
⌢
1
. . .⌢ yn, l, k) →
(P ⋆(w,x1, . . . , xn)↔ P ⋆(v, y1, . . . , yn))).
For all predicates P ∈ σ.
(c) Frame back and forth is the conjunction of the following sentences.
◊-Forth. ∀w,v,w′,∀x1, . . . , xn, y1 . . . , yn,∀l, k
( Z(w,x⌢
1
. . .⌢ xn, v, y
⌢
1
. . .⌢ yn, l, k) ∧ relM(w,w′, l) ∧
∃s left(k) = s + 1 →
∃v′ (relN(v, v′, l) ∧ Z(w′, x⌢1 . . .
⌢ xn, v′, y
⌢
1
. . .⌢ yn, l, ⟨s, right(k)⟩))).
◊-Back. ∀w,v, v′,∀x1, . . . , xn, y1 . . . , yn,∀l, k
( Z(w,x⌢
1
. . .⌢ xn, v, y
⌢
1
. . .⌢ yn, l, k) ∧ relN(v, v′, l) ∧
∃s left(k) = s + 1 →
∃w′ (relM(w,w′, l) ∧ Z(w′, x⌢1 . . .
⌢ xn, v′, y
⌢
1
. . .⌢ yn, l, ⟨s, right(k)⟩))).
(d) Domain back and forth is the conjunction of the following sentences.
∃-Forth. ∀w,v,∀x1, . . . , xn,∀y1, . . . , yn,∀x,∀l, k
( Z(w,x⌢
1
. . .⌢ xn, v, y
⌢
1
. . .⌢ yn, l, k) ∧ domM(x, l) ∧
∃s right(k) = s + 1 →
∃y (domN(y, l) ∧ Z(w,x⌢1 . . .
⌢ x⌢nx, v, y
⌢
1
. . .⌢ y⌢ny, l, ⟨left(k), s⟩))).
∃-Back. ∀w,v,∀x1, . . . , xn,∀y1, . . . , yn,∀y,∀l, k
( Z(w,x⌢
1
. . .⌢ xn, v, y
⌢
1
. . .⌢ yn, l, k) ∧ domN(y, l) ∧
∃s right(k) = s + 1 →
∃x (domM(x, l) ∧ Z(w,x⌢1 . . .
⌢ x⌢nx, v, y
⌢
1
. . .⌢ y⌢ny, l, ⟨left(k), s⟩))).
3Note that the model (C′, c0) is closed under both modM(x,n) and modN(x,n).
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11. Since for each n ∈ N (Mn,wn)⇄n (Nn, vn), it follows that
C′, c0 ⊧ ∀n∀w,v (◊rootM(w,n) ∧ ◊rootN(v,n) → Z(w,λ, v, λ,n,n)).
12. σLind statements indicate the basic properties of coding that is
⟨, ⟩ is a bijective function and left and right are unique functions such that
⟨left(n), right(n)⟩ = n, for each n ∈ N.
13. ⌢ is a concatination function.
14. Finally, formalize the basic properties of order ≤ by the following sentences:
• N under ≤ is a linear order with well-defined successors and predecessors
except for the first element.
• α0 = ∀n ∃w,v (◊rootM(w,n) ∧ ◊rootN(v,n)).
• α1 = ∃n 1 ≤ n.
• α2 = ∃n (1 ≤ n ∧ 2 ≤ n).
⋮
Having defined the above statements, let TLind be the L[σLind]-theory consisting of
sentences above.
Note that any finite subset of TLind is satisfiable in (C′, c0). Therefore, by the
compactness property, TLind has a model (E, e). Choose two non-standard elements
H1 andH2 in (NE,≤E) and forH = ⟨H1,H2⟩, define two models (MˆH , wˆH) and (NˆH , vˆH)
as follows. (Subsequently, from (E, e) one can extract two σ-models.)
• WMˆH = {w ∈WE ∣ E,w ⊧ ∃w worldM(w,H)}.
• RMˆH = RE ↾WMˆH .
• DMˆH = {a ∈DE ∣ E,w ⊧ domM(a,H) for all w ∈WMˆH}.
• For each w ∈WMˆH , and any a1, . . . , an inDMˆH and any predicate P ∈ σ, IMˆH(w,P ) =
{ (a1, . . . , an) ∣E,w ⊧ P (a1, . . . , an)}. Also, IMˆH(c) = IE(c), for each constant
symbol c ∈ σ.
• wˆH is a world in WMˆH such that E, wˆH ⊧ ∃w rootM(w,H).
24
Note that the existence of wˆH is guaranteed by the statement 14. We may similarly
define (NˆH , vˆH).
Using the sentence 11 which is included in TLind one can see that for (MˆH , wˆH) and
(NˆH , vˆH) the relation Z(wˆH , λ, vˆH , λ,H,H) holds, wˆH and vˆH are those elements of
DE where E, wˆH ⊧ worldM(wˆH ,H) and E, vˆH ⊧ worldN(vˆH ,H). Also, the sentence 9
implies that (MˆH , wˆH) ⊧ φ, while (NˆH , vˆH) ⊧ ¬φ.
Define a relation Z ′ between (MˆH , wˆH) and (NˆH , vˆH) as follows.
Z ′ = { (wa1 . . . an, vb1 . . . bn) ∣ n ≥ 0, E, e0 ⊧ Z(w, a⌢1 . . .
⌢ an,v, b
⌢
1 . . .
⌢ bn,H,K)
for some k ≥ 0}.
Note that by the statement 11 (wˆH , vˆH) ∈ Z ′ so Z ′ ≠ ∅. The statements appearing
in 10 guarantee that Z ′ is a bisimulation between (MˆH , wˆH) and (NˆH , vˆH).
The following theorem can be seen as a strengthening of van Benthem invariance
theorem (Theorem 2.8) (see Corollary 3.4 in [20] for propositional case).
Corollary 3.8. Let L be a compact abstract logic extending first-order modal logic.
Then FML is the bisimulation invariant fragment of L. In particular, FML is the
bisimulation invariant fragment of first-order logic.
3.3 Some Other Lindstro¨m Theorem
The method of proving theorem 3.7 could not be applied for varying domain Kripke
models to give a general Lindstro¨m theorem for first-order modal logic. So we have
to look for some other versions of the Lindstro¨m theorem which can be used to give a
characterization theorem related to varying domain Kripke models.
The other versions of the Lindstro¨m theorem, for example Theorem 2.2.1 in [9] and
Theorem 6 in [16] use a variant of the Tarski union property. Here we extend this
results to give a characterizing theorem for FML based on the Tarski union property.
To be more precise, we extend the method used by Piro and Otto in [16] for proving the
Lindstro¨m theorem for modal logic with global modality. We assume that an abstract
logic has the closure properties of Definition 3.2.
First of all, note that FML has the Tarski union property (TUP). Let ⟨I,≤⟩ be a
linear order and ⟨Mi ∶ i ∈ I⟩ be a chain of varying domain Kripke models; Mi ⊆ Mj
for all i, j ∈ I with i ≤ j. The union of chain ⟨Mi ∶ i ∈ I⟩ abbreviated by M∞, is
a model ⋃i∈I Mi = (⋃i∈IWi,⋃i∈I Ri,⋃i∈IDi,⋃i∈I Ii,{⋃i∈IDi(w)}). Since Mi ⊆ Mj , the
above definition is well defined.
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We say that ⟨Mi ∶ i ∈ I⟩ is an elementary chain when for each i, j ∈ I with i ≤ j,
Mi ⪯Mj.
The following proposition is routine and is shown by an easy induction on formulas.
Proposition 3.9. For any elementary chain of Kripke models ⟨Mi ∶ i ∈ I⟩, M∞ is the
elementary extension of each Mi.
Note that by the same argument used in Proposition 2.15 [1], one may prove that
first-order modal logic has the tree model property, that is any satisfiable first-order
modal theory is also satisfiable in a tree-like model. In fact, any pointed Kripke model
(M,w) is bisimilar to a model (N, v0) whose frame (WN,RN) is a tree with a countable
depth that is for every world v ∈WN there is a finite path from the root v0 to v.
Let ThL(M,w) denote the theory of (M,w) in L. We omit the subscript L if the
logic L is FML.
SupposeM and N are two σ-models. N is an L-elementary extension ofM, denoted
by M ⪯L N, if M is a submodel of N and for any w ∈ WM and any finite set A =
{a1, . . . , an} ⊆DM, MA,w ⊧ φ if and only if NA,w ⊧ φ for any σ ∪ {c1, . . . , cn}-sentence
φ in L.
Proposition 3.10. Let L be a compact abstract logic extending FML. Then for every
tree-like model (M,w0) whose frame has a countable depth there is an L-elementary
extension (N, v0) which realizes all types of (M,w), for all w in M.
Proof. Let
σ′ ∶= σ ∪ {(Pw,1) ∣ w ∈WM}
∪ {(Pw,Γ,1) ∣ w ∈WM and Γ is a modal-type of M}
∪ {(Pw,Γ, n) ∣ w ∈WM and Γ is an ∃-type of M with n variable }
∪ {cd ∣ d ∈DM}.
Since (WM,RM) is a countable depth tree, for every w ∈WM there is a unique finite
path from w0 (the root) to w with the depth nw. Now for any w,w′ ∈W and any n ∈ N
consider the following sentences:
1. ◊nw∀xPw(x).
2. ◻n(∀xPw(x)Ð→ ¬∀xPw′(x)), if w′ ≠ w.
3. ◻n(∀xPw(x)Ð→ ◊∀xPw′(x)), if (w,w′) ∈ R.
4. ◻n(∀xPw(x)Ð→ ¬◊∀xPw′(x)), if (w,w′) /∈ R.
5. ◻n(∀xPw(x)Ð→ ξ), for all σ ∪ {cd ∣d ∈DM}-sentence ξ ∈ ThL(M,w).
6. ◻n(∀xPw(x)Ð→ ◊∀xPw,Γ(x)), for all modal-type Γ of (M,w).
7. ◻n(∀xPw(x)Ð→ ∃y¯Pw,Γ(y¯)), for all ∃-type Γ(y¯) of (M,w).
8. ◻n∀y¯(Pw,Γ(y¯)Ð→ φ(y¯)), for all φ(y¯) ∈ Γ (∃-type) and Pw,Γ ∈ σ′.
9. ◻n ◻ (∀xPw,Γ(x) Ð→ φ(ca1 , . . . , can)) for all φ(ca1 , . . . , can) ∈ Γ (modal-type) and
Pw,Γ ∈ σ′.
One can easily see that whenever a tree-like model N satisfies axioms 1-5 for any
w ∈ WM, then M can be elementary embedded in N. Furthermore, if N also satisfies
axioms 6-9, it realizes all types of M.
Let T ′ be a σ′-theory containing all of the above sentences for each w ∈ W . Any
modal-type and respectively ∃-type are finitely satisfiable in M. Also, T ′ is finitely
satisfiable in (a σ′-expansion of) (M,w0). Hence, by the compactness of L, T ′ is
satisfiable. Let (N, v) ⊧ T ′. Since L is invariant under bisimulation, we can consider
N as a model whose frame is a tree with a countable depth. Therefore, N is an
L-elementary extension of M and N realizes all types of M.
Proposition 3.11. Let L be an abstract compact logic extending FML with the Tarski
union property. Suppose that L is invariant under bisimulations. Then every tree-like
model M whose frame has a countable depth has a modally-saturated L-elementary
extension.
Proof. We build an L-elementary chain ⟨Ni ∶ i ∈ N⟩ as follows. Let N0 = M. For all
i ≥ 1 let Ni+1 be a tree-like L-elementary extension of Ni that realizes every type of Ni.
By Proposition 3.10 and bisimulation invariance this model exists. Let N = ⋃i∈NNi.
Since L has TUP, N is an L-elementary extension of each Ni. On the other hand, N
is modally-saturated, since if Γ is any type of (M,w), for some w ∈WM there is some
i ∈ N such that Γ is a type of Ni and so realized in Ni+1.
By the same argument used in [16] (Proposition 14) the following proposition is
established:
Proposition 3.12. If L is a compact logic extending FML and there is a sentence
φ ∈ L not equivalent to any ξ in FML, then there are two models (M,w) and (N, v)
such that Th(M,w) = Th(N, v) but they disagree on φ.
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Theorem 3.13. Any compact and bisimulation invariant logic L ⊇ FML is equivalent
to FML if and only if it satisfies the TUP.
Proof. Assume that there is a sentence φ in L which is not equivalent to any for-
mula of FML. By Proposition 3.12, there are two models (M,w) and (N, v) such that
Th(M,w) = Th(N, v) while (M,w) ⊧ φ and (N, v) ⊧ ¬φ. By invariance under bisim-
ulation, we may assume that (M,w) and (N, v) are two tree-like models where their
frames have a countable depth. According to Proposition 3.11, there are two saturated
models (M∗,w∗) and (N∗, v∗) such that ThL(M,w) = ThL(M∗,w∗) and ThL(N, v) =
ThL(N∗, v∗). It follows that Th(M∗,w) = Th(N∗, v). Now by the Hennessy-Milner
theorem (M∗,w)⇄ (N∗, v). Therefore, (M∗,w∗) ⊧ φ and (N∗, v∗) ⊧ ¬φ, contradicting
invariance under bisimulations.
4 Future Research
This paper is set out with the aim of extending two theorems with propositional nature
to first-order modal logic.
Theorem 2.16 provides a generalization of the Goldblatt-Thomason theorem and
unravels the expressive power of first-order modal logic in axiomatizing much broader
elementary classes of frames. This result opens a new line of research in finding prop-
erties which guarantee that elementary classes of skeletons are first-order modally de-
finable. For further reference in this line of work see [21] in which the correspondence
theory is discussed for some special classes of skeletons.
Furthermore, restriction of Theorem 2.16 to constant domain Kripke models gives
raise to the question of finding some alternative results for varying domain Kripke
models.
The second part of the present paper is devoted to proving some version of Lind-
stro¨m characterization theorem for FML.
There are many ways of generalizing both Theorems 3.7 and 3.13. We suggest
to find a version of Theorem 3.7 which is true for varying domain Kripke models.
On the other hand, one may substitute the semantics of first-order modal logic by
neighborhood semantics and study the Lindstro¨m theorem in that context.
Our approach in this paper is model theoretic. Since the Goldblatt-Thomason and
Lindstro¨m theorems both have coalgebraic forms (see [12] and [13, 7]), it is natural to
look for the question of studying coalgebraic adaptation of these theorems.
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